Starting from its return in 2010, Orbán's government
enacted a series of constitutional and institutional changes, including the 2013
amendments to the Constitution of Hungary,
reforms to the judiciary affecting the administration of courts, and the creation of regulatory bodies overseeing media.
Organizations such as the European Commission and Freedom House have described these developments as weakening judicial independence and media pluralism, and enabling democratic backsliding.
His government has also faced allegations of corruption involving the allocation of public contracts and EU funds.
Orbán lost the 2026 parliamentary election, which saw record turnout, to Péter Magyar's Tisza Party in a landslide. Orbán subsequently announced that he would both remain as leader of Fidesz and refuse to take his seat in the new parliament, which subsequently adopted a constitutional amendment barring Orbán from returning to the prime ministry by imposing a two-term limit on the position.
While advocating Christian nationalism and describing his political model as an "illiberal state", he promoted soft Euroscepticism,
opposition to liberal democracy, and closer economic and political ties with countries including China, Russia, and Turkey.
His government faced allegations of enriching elites associated with the administration, and was characterized as a
kleptocracy.
Analysts and institutions variously characterized Hungary under his leadership as a hybrid regime,
dominant-party system, or mafia state.
