An intresting columnist article from the daily pioneer on this agreement
Source
pasting here in case the URL times out
Accepting US suzerainty
Satish Chandra
Monday 30th July 2007
The 123 Agreement, along with the Hyde Act, will adversely affect the evolution of India's nuclear weapon capability. It is the precursor to several moves by the UPA Government that will enhance India's dependency on the US and take it into the American camp, making us a client state
While there can be no denying that in today's unipolar world India must try and cultivate close ties with the United States, equally, every patriotic Indian would expect that this endeavour should in no way jeopardise national interest or undermine national sovereignty.
With the nuclear deal on the verge of being concluded we are at a defining moment in India-US relations. The deal will not only cripple India's strategic deterrent and erode its sovereignty but will also reduce it to a client state of the US by providing the latter with requisite leverages to ensure that it never steps out of line.
No matter what gloss the UPA Government puts upon the 123 Agreement, the separation plan agreed to by it will adversely affect the evolution of India's nuclear weapon capability as will the Hyde Act which is the framework legislation under which the 123 Agreement is to be operated. The Hyde Act, moreover, without permitting India the benefit of full civil nuclear cooperation, as envisaged in the July 18, 2005 understanding, makes US cooperation conditional on many humiliating provisions restricting the independence of Indian foreign policy and requiring a rigorous oversight of its nuclear programme, both civilian and military. The Hyde Act also provides that India remains under constant threat of termination of cooperation if in the US assessment it has not lived up to its commitments.
Despite the groundswell of opposition to the nuclear deal in the country, the Government is clearly determined to go ahead with it. It is unfortunate that towards this end it has not hesitated to engage in an information war against its own citizens by keeping the text of the 123 Agreement secret while at the same time engaging in selective briefings designed to project it in a favourable light.
The 123 Agreement is the precursor to and, indeed, the fulcrum around which the Government is actively considering several moves that will enhance India's dependency on the US and take it irrevocably into the US camp. Some of these are an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), more frequent exercises with the US and allied military forces, increased US arms purchase arrangements, participation in the US-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), active support to a US-sponsored Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT), etc.
In mid July Gen Kohler, Director of the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency, and Admiral Wieringa, while in India reportedly finalised the text of an ACSA which now awaits Cabinet Committee on Security approval. It has been argued that ACSA is merely an arrangement to facilitate mutual logistic support during military exercises. This is too simplistic a projection. The fact is that ACSA provides US combatant commanders the means to acquire logistic support from our armed forces during training, exercises and military operations.
The US has concluded nearly 80 such agreements mainly with NATO and allied countries. While such agreements do not theoretically commit the host country to military action the very act of concluding them makes such countries aligned to the US and a party to its actions. Thus, our hosting, the USS Nimitz at our ports in early July while in active operation in connection with the Iraq situation makes us a party to US actions in that country.
The underlying philosophy of these agreements is to enhance the rapid deployment capability of US forces into theatres far removed from their bases. It is relevant to recall that Mr Douglas Feith, the former US Under Secretary of Defence, publicly indicated in December 2003 that the rapid deployability of US forces required that they "must be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations" and that for this purpose the US was inter alia "putting in place so-called cross servicing agreements so that we can rapidly reimburse countries for support they provide to our military operations."
India's signing of ACSA will, therefore, mark its formal entry into the US sphere of influence and signal its willingness to allow itself to be used to usher in the American century in Asia. It is ironical that this step would be undertaken by a leadership, tracing its roots to the Nehru-Gandhi family for which non-alignment was an article of faith, and by a Government relying for its survival on the Communists to whom the US is an anathema.
This craven alignment with the US even fails the test of realpolitik as the US has conferred no special benefits on India, befitting a country which it says it wants to help get great power status, such as support for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, recognition as a nuclear weapon state, or even an invitation to participate in the multi-nation naval anti terror task force in the Arabian Sea of which Pakistan has long been a member.
The conclusion of ACSA will inevitably lead to an increase, both quantitative and qualitative, in India's military exercises with the US which have for sometime been on an upward spiral. This, coupled with the alacrity with which we participated in trilateral exercises in April with the US and Japan, and have agreed to the US-Japan-Australia- Singapore-India exercises, taken together with our hesitation to participate in trilateral exercises with China and Russia and our lukewarm approach to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, will fuel suspicions that we have opted to cast our lot with the US. There is nothing per se wrong with engaging in military exercises with the US but if the scale and nature of these exercises is out of all proportion with those conducted with other countries it will naturally place in doubt our bona fide as an independent player in the region.
The grease lubricating the nuclear deal is the prospect of multi-billion-dollar contracts not just for nuclear reactors but also for arms purchases. Some of the major deals being oriented towards the US are:
[*]$ 10 billion contract for 126 multi role combat aircraft;
[*]$ 900 million contract for 127 helicopters for the Army Aviation Corp;
[*]Multi-billion dollar contracts for over 200 radars;
[*]$ 2 billion to $ 3 billion contract for 8 to 16 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft;
[*]$ 2 billion to $ 3 billion contract for equipment to promote network centricity in the Armed Forces; and,
[*]$ 2 billion contract for 400 artillery guns.
[/list]
In considering the US for such massive defence orders, the Government appears to have totally discounted factors of cost, compatibility and, most important, reliability of supplies. Indeed, the US proclivity to suspend supplies at the drop of a hat on the flimsiest of excuses should have made it a non-starter for consideration for such contracts. Moreover, diversion of such orders from our traditional supplier, namely Russia, will impinge adversely on our ties with it and prompt it to find a new market in Pakistan.
It is on the cards that India will, as required under the Hyde Act, join the PSI which it has long been averse to, as well as abide by the policies of the Australia Group and the Wassenar Arrangements without enjoying the benefits of membership. Similarly, though India traditionally only favours a FMCT with an international and effective verification mechanism, under the weight of the Hyde Act, which requires it to work "actively" with the US for early conclusion of this Treaty, it is moving towards modifying its position and going along with the US which is against the Indian position and favours verification through national technical means.
Acceptance of the US position is not in the national interest as it will deprive India of a place at the high table in operationalisation of the FMCT that would, for all practical purposes, be in the hands of the US as the country with the most advanced national technical means. An early conclusion of the FMCT would also not serve India's interest as it requires time to built up adequate stocks of fissile material for its strategic deterrent.
It would be evident from the foregoing that the 123 and associated agreements, which will entail the outgo of billions of dollars, far from promoting India's emergence as a great power, will see it relegated to the status of a subsidiary state under US suzerainty. While this, of course, constitutes the mother of all follies on the part of our leadership it is also a failure of the entire political class which should have done much more to avert it.
Source
pasting here in case the URL times out
Accepting US suzerainty
Satish Chandra
Monday 30th July 2007
The 123 Agreement, along with the Hyde Act, will adversely affect the evolution of India's nuclear weapon capability. It is the precursor to several moves by the UPA Government that will enhance India's dependency on the US and take it into the American camp, making us a client state
While there can be no denying that in today's unipolar world India must try and cultivate close ties with the United States, equally, every patriotic Indian would expect that this endeavour should in no way jeopardise national interest or undermine national sovereignty.
With the nuclear deal on the verge of being concluded we are at a defining moment in India-US relations. The deal will not only cripple India's strategic deterrent and erode its sovereignty but will also reduce it to a client state of the US by providing the latter with requisite leverages to ensure that it never steps out of line.
No matter what gloss the UPA Government puts upon the 123 Agreement, the separation plan agreed to by it will adversely affect the evolution of India's nuclear weapon capability as will the Hyde Act which is the framework legislation under which the 123 Agreement is to be operated. The Hyde Act, moreover, without permitting India the benefit of full civil nuclear cooperation, as envisaged in the July 18, 2005 understanding, makes US cooperation conditional on many humiliating provisions restricting the independence of Indian foreign policy and requiring a rigorous oversight of its nuclear programme, both civilian and military. The Hyde Act also provides that India remains under constant threat of termination of cooperation if in the US assessment it has not lived up to its commitments.
Despite the groundswell of opposition to the nuclear deal in the country, the Government is clearly determined to go ahead with it. It is unfortunate that towards this end it has not hesitated to engage in an information war against its own citizens by keeping the text of the 123 Agreement secret while at the same time engaging in selective briefings designed to project it in a favourable light.
The 123 Agreement is the precursor to and, indeed, the fulcrum around which the Government is actively considering several moves that will enhance India's dependency on the US and take it irrevocably into the US camp. Some of these are an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), more frequent exercises with the US and allied military forces, increased US arms purchase arrangements, participation in the US-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), active support to a US-sponsored Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT), etc.
In mid July Gen Kohler, Director of the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency, and Admiral Wieringa, while in India reportedly finalised the text of an ACSA which now awaits Cabinet Committee on Security approval. It has been argued that ACSA is merely an arrangement to facilitate mutual logistic support during military exercises. This is too simplistic a projection. The fact is that ACSA provides US combatant commanders the means to acquire logistic support from our armed forces during training, exercises and military operations.
The US has concluded nearly 80 such agreements mainly with NATO and allied countries. While such agreements do not theoretically commit the host country to military action the very act of concluding them makes such countries aligned to the US and a party to its actions. Thus, our hosting, the USS Nimitz at our ports in early July while in active operation in connection with the Iraq situation makes us a party to US actions in that country.
The underlying philosophy of these agreements is to enhance the rapid deployment capability of US forces into theatres far removed from their bases. It is relevant to recall that Mr Douglas Feith, the former US Under Secretary of Defence, publicly indicated in December 2003 that the rapid deployability of US forces required that they "must be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations" and that for this purpose the US was inter alia "putting in place so-called cross servicing agreements so that we can rapidly reimburse countries for support they provide to our military operations."
India's signing of ACSA will, therefore, mark its formal entry into the US sphere of influence and signal its willingness to allow itself to be used to usher in the American century in Asia. It is ironical that this step would be undertaken by a leadership, tracing its roots to the Nehru-Gandhi family for which non-alignment was an article of faith, and by a Government relying for its survival on the Communists to whom the US is an anathema.
This craven alignment with the US even fails the test of realpolitik as the US has conferred no special benefits on India, befitting a country which it says it wants to help get great power status, such as support for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, recognition as a nuclear weapon state, or even an invitation to participate in the multi-nation naval anti terror task force in the Arabian Sea of which Pakistan has long been a member.
The conclusion of ACSA will inevitably lead to an increase, both quantitative and qualitative, in India's military exercises with the US which have for sometime been on an upward spiral. This, coupled with the alacrity with which we participated in trilateral exercises in April with the US and Japan, and have agreed to the US-Japan-Australia- Singapore-India exercises, taken together with our hesitation to participate in trilateral exercises with China and Russia and our lukewarm approach to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, will fuel suspicions that we have opted to cast our lot with the US. There is nothing per se wrong with engaging in military exercises with the US but if the scale and nature of these exercises is out of all proportion with those conducted with other countries it will naturally place in doubt our bona fide as an independent player in the region.
The grease lubricating the nuclear deal is the prospect of multi-billion-dollar contracts not just for nuclear reactors but also for arms purchases. Some of the major deals being oriented towards the US are:
[*]$ 10 billion contract for 126 multi role combat aircraft;
[*]$ 900 million contract for 127 helicopters for the Army Aviation Corp;
[*]Multi-billion dollar contracts for over 200 radars;
[*]$ 2 billion to $ 3 billion contract for 8 to 16 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft;
[*]$ 2 billion to $ 3 billion contract for equipment to promote network centricity in the Armed Forces; and,
[*]$ 2 billion contract for 400 artillery guns.
[/list]
In considering the US for such massive defence orders, the Government appears to have totally discounted factors of cost, compatibility and, most important, reliability of supplies. Indeed, the US proclivity to suspend supplies at the drop of a hat on the flimsiest of excuses should have made it a non-starter for consideration for such contracts. Moreover, diversion of such orders from our traditional supplier, namely Russia, will impinge adversely on our ties with it and prompt it to find a new market in Pakistan.
It is on the cards that India will, as required under the Hyde Act, join the PSI which it has long been averse to, as well as abide by the policies of the Australia Group and the Wassenar Arrangements without enjoying the benefits of membership. Similarly, though India traditionally only favours a FMCT with an international and effective verification mechanism, under the weight of the Hyde Act, which requires it to work "actively" with the US for early conclusion of this Treaty, it is moving towards modifying its position and going along with the US which is against the Indian position and favours verification through national technical means.
Acceptance of the US position is not in the national interest as it will deprive India of a place at the high table in operationalisation of the FMCT that would, for all practical purposes, be in the hands of the US as the country with the most advanced national technical means. An early conclusion of the FMCT would also not serve India's interest as it requires time to built up adequate stocks of fissile material for its strategic deterrent.
It would be evident from the foregoing that the 123 and associated agreements, which will entail the outgo of billions of dollars, far from promoting India's emergence as a great power, will see it relegated to the status of a subsidiary state under US suzerainty. While this, of course, constitutes the mother of all follies on the part of our leadership it is also a failure of the entire political class which should have done much more to avert it.
