Source
Deal will end our isolation
Aug 23 2007
G Parthasarathy
Never in independent India's history has a foreign policy issue been so hotly and comprehensively debated as the July 2005 India-US civil nuclear Agreement that seeks to end, not just American, but global nuclear sanctions against India. The acrimonious exchanges between supporters and detractors of the July 2005 Agreement has precipitated a political crisis, with the Left parties voicing concern over the Hyde Act passed by the US Congress that seeks to end existing sanctions against India and about what the Left refers to as a "strategic alliance" with the US. Why is it important to sign an agreement with the US on nuclear cooperation given the manner in which the US unilaterally abrogated a solemn agreement with us to supply nuclear fuel for the Tarapur Power Plant?
Ever since the Pokhran nuclear test of 1974, successive US Administrations have endeavoured to coerce us to "cap, roll back and eliminate" our nuclear weapons programme. This effort included establishing a cartel of 45 countries, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), to join the US to deny us access to nuclear technology for power generation. Despite this, we have built our own nuclear reactors fuelled by natural uranium and are on the way to building indigenous fast breeder reactors, using indigenous resources of thorium ore. This process will be facilitated and made self-sustaining if we have large resources of plutonium from power reactors.
Unfortunately, our own capabilities to develop nuclear energy are seriously constrained by the shortage of indigenous resources of uranium ore, making import of uranium ore imperative for significant nuclear power development. Moreover, is it desirable for a country like India to face the international odium of being subject to sanctions by 45 countries, when global solutions are required for developing non-polluting energy resources?
What India is attempting is not merely an end to American, but global sanctions. It has been evident that international sanctions against us will not end unless, in the first instance, the US ends them. This has been conveyed to us by good friends like Russia and France. Hence, when President George W Bush took the decision to move to end US sanctions, it was only natural for us to seize the opportunity.
Opposition to the July 18, 2005, Agreement is as strong in the US as it is in India. But, even if there are shortcomings in the 123 Agreement that has been agreed upon, this is the only available key to ending nuclear sanctions against India now imposed by 45 countries. India has held extensive consultations with the members of the NSG. China has strongly lobbied NSG members against ending nuclear sanctions on India, duly assisted by its 'all-weather friend' and partner in nuclear and missile proliferation, Pakistan.
There are three issues that need to be considered in any agreement we sign on nuclear energy cooperation. Does the agreement contain guarantees for uninterrupted supply of fuel for the lifetime of imported reactors? Can we reprocess the spent fuel for use in future fast breeder reactors? Does the agreement constrain our strategic nuclear weapons programme, including our right and freedom to test nuclear weapons, should the need arise? The State Department spokesman categorically asserted: "The proposed agreement has provisions in it that in the event of a nuclear test by India, all cooperation is terminated." Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asserted: "The agreement does not in any way affect India's right to undertake future nuclear tests if necessary."
The US spokesperson soon had to backtrack, as his assertion was not entirely correct. Under Article 14, the US could seek termination of the agreement and return of nuclear fuel in the event of a nuclear test by India. But the entire process would involve detailed consultations, with the US giving due consideration to India's security imperatives. Thus, if India were to carry out a nuclear test in response to tests by a nuclear-armed neighbour, the US would find it difficult to justify or implement sanctions.
India will, however, not be able to internationally justify any nuclear test, or avoid worldwide condemnation and sanctions with or without the 123 Agreement, if it unilaterally and suddenly conducts a nuclear test, when the rest of the world is eschewing nuclear testing.
Nuclear sanctions will end only after India concludes a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the NSG ends global sanctions on India and the US Congress approves the 123 Agreement. It is at that stage that Parliament has to exercise maximum vigilance on how future imports for nuclear energy are undertaken. Section 5.6 of the 123 Agreement provides for India to maintain stockpiles of nuclear fuel that can meet its lifetime requirements of imported reactors in the event of termination of US Supplies. An action plan for the maintenance of reserve stockpiles needs to be drawn up.
Any agreement for the import of reactors from the US should contain specific provisions that we can import fuel for these reactors from countries other than the US. As a further safeguard, the Atomic Energy Act could be amended to provide for foreign equity participation in any imported nuclear power plant. Further, no reactors should be imported from the US till procedures for reprocessing spent fuel are approved by the US Congress. Contrary to claims by Government functionaries, we do not have an unfettered 'right' to reprocessing under the 123 Agreement.
The end of sanctions should not be construed as an open license for excessive imports. Parliament will have to ensure that a substantial proportion of our reactors are indigenous, even though they may be run on imported iron ore. Indigenous reactors are more cost efficient than imported ones. The effort should be to promote energy security by expeditious and effective development of our three stage, thorium-based fast breeder reactor programme. But, at the same time, we have to realise that any future American Administration will not be as forthcoming as that of Mr Bush in ending nuclear sanctions.
International sanctions will end only after we negotiate an India specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the NSG decides to end sanctions, overcoming China's opposition. Parliament should finally accept or reject the terms set by the US and the NSG only after the entire process of ending sanctions is completed. It makes little sense to halt or delay the process at this stage.